

CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF EXPENDITURE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL BY MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. SENATE, UNDER AUTHORITY OF SEC. 22, P.L. 95-384—22 U.S.C. 1754(b), FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE FROM JULY 1 TO SEPT. 30, 1997

Name and country	Name of currency	Per diem		Transportation		Miscellaneous		Total	
		Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency
Steve Benza:									
China .....	Dollar .....		753.00						753.00
Hong Kong .....	Dollar .....		788.00						788.00
Total .....			1,541.00						1,541.00

STROM THURMOND,  
President Pro Tempore, Feb. 10, 1998.

CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF EXPENDITURE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES AND APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL BY MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. SENATE, UNDER AUTHORITY OF SEC. 22, P.L. 95-384—22 U.S.C. 1754(b), FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZED BY THE MAJORITY LEADER FROM OCT. 1 TO DEC. 31, 1997

Name and country	Name of currency	Per diem		Transportation		Miscellaneous		Total	
		Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency	Foreign currency	U.S. dollar equivalent or U.S. currency
Ian Brzezinski:									
Turkey .....	Dollar .....		516.00						516.00
Azerbaijan .....	Dollar .....		573.00						573.00
Kazakhstan .....	Dollar .....		606.00						606.00
Uzbekistan .....	Dollar .....		592.00						592.00
Turkmenistan .....	Dollar .....		193.00						193.00
Norway .....	Dollar .....		305.00						305.00
Senator William V. Roth, Jr.:									
Estonia .....	Dollar .....		412.00						412.00
Germany .....	Dollar .....		223.00						223.00
Portugal .....	Dollar .....		206.00						206.00
Senator Robert Bennett:									
Estonia .....	Dollar .....		369.00						369.00
Germany .....	Dollar .....		223.00						223.00
Portugal .....	Dollar .....		206.00						206.00
Kent Bonham:									
Germany .....	Dollar .....	1,827.78	1,025.00					1,827.78	1,025.00
United States .....	Dollar .....			1,037.90					1,037.90
Ian Brzezinski:									
Estonia .....	Dollar .....		412.00						412.00
Germany .....	Dollar .....		446.00						446.00
Total .....			6,306.00		1,037.90				7,344.90

TRENT LOTT,  
Majority Leader, Jan. 23, 1998.

## ORDERS FOR MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1998

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 noon on Monday, March 2, and immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted, and there be a period for morning business until 2 p.m., with the time equally divided among the two leaders.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. 1173

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 2 p.m. on Monday, March 2, the Senate resume consideration of S. 1173, the ISTE A bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## RECORD TO REMAIN OPEN UNTIL 2 P.M. TODAY

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD stay open until 2 p.m. today for the introduction of legislation and the submission of statements.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## PROGRAM

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, in conjunction with the previous unanimous consent agreements, Monday the Senate will be in a period for morning business from 12 noon until 2 p.m. At 2 p.m., the Senate will resume consideration of S. 1173, the so-called ISTE A legislation. It is hoped that the Senate will be able to make good progress on this important legislation during Monday's session. In addition, the Senate may consider any executive or legislative business cleared for floor action. Therefore, rollcall votes are possible Monday after 5 p.m.

## ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the remarks of Senator WARNER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

## NATO EXPANSION MORATORIUM CONDITION

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President I wish to associate myself with other colleagues who have risen today to ad-

dress the importance of the issue of NATO expansion. For almost a year's time now, I have expressed publicly, both in this country and in Europe, my deep reservations about the proposed expansion of this alliance. I listened carefully to a briefing about the remarks of my colleagues today, and I wish to associate myself with their remarks because I think this body must spend whatever time it feels is necessary to carefully analyze this question.

NATO was put in place at a historic moment in our history. I always credit President Harry Truman for his foresight, together with that of others, regarding the importance of this wonderful, absolutely magnificent, military alliance that has exceeded, in every way, the expectations of its founders. Unquestionably, in this Senator's mind, and I think in the minds of many, we averted a military confrontation with the former Soviet Union as a consequence of the NATO treaty. I think that the basic tensions that existed in Europe at that time exist today, although not at the same level of intensity.

There has always been a measure of instability between the major powers on the continent and indeed with Great Britain. The United States has fulfilled, I think, quietly, nevertheless effectively, a strong, steady hand on those competitive forces amongst those

very ancient nations—certainly ancient in terms of the 200-plus-year history of this country—as they have struggled in terms of economic competition and, indeed, tragically in military confrontations in years past.

My father served in World War I in France as a doctor. That was the first time that the United States really responded militarily by going to that continent. And then, of course, World War II is very clear in the memories of all. So those are just two examples.

So, Mr. President, I rise today as in executive session to submit for the RECORD a condition that I will seek to attach to the Resolution of Ratification, the U.S. Senate's procedure under the "advice and consent" clause of the U.S. Constitution, to facilitate the proposed NATO expansion.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the condition be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the text of the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

At the appropriate place in the resolution, insert the following:

( ) UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING FURTHER EXPANSION OF NATO.—Prior to the date of ratification of the Protocols by the United States, the President shall certify to the Senate that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further expansion in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a period of at least three years beginning on the date of entry into force of the last of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to enter into force.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to thank my distinguished colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, from New York from being my principal co-sponsor. Throughout he has been a consistent supporter of this objective and will be the principal Member from the other side of the aisle as I work this amendment among our body.

Let me also say thanks for the very important contributions of Senator BINGAMAN. He serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee with me. He is a broad-based thinker on national security issues, and he will be joining us as we seek to get the support of our colleagues.

As I stated throughout last year, 1997, and continuing this year, I publicly have spoken here and in Europe regarding my deep concerns over the proposed expansion of NATO by admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which is the current proposal.

I believe these accessions are not in the security interests of the NATO alliance. My detailed reasons against are to be found in earlier statements.

In the course of the ratification debate, I will work with colleagues in opposition to the ratification of these three nations. I view my amendment, however, as supportive of our shared goals, and in no way should it be viewed as a concession on my part in

my opposition or an indication that I accept the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as a fait accompli. But I have had this amendment in mind, and I have spoken about it. I discussed it at length at the Wehrkunde conference a few weeks ago when I was privileged to be in the company of the Secretary of Defense and the delegation from the Senate that was headed by Senator MCCAIN, one of our most valued Members in areas of national defense. I am not suggesting that either of those persons share my view, but I did at that time express it very clearly to a number of persons attending that conference.

This condition does not affect the three nations currently under consideration for NATO membership—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Rather it focuses on the future by requiring a "strategic pause" of 3 years before proceeding with any further expansion of NATO membership.

As to my reasons for opposition to NATO expansion, I start from the basic premise that NATO has been the most successful military alliance in the history of the United States, perhaps, in the history of the world. NATO has surpassed all of the expectations of its founders, keeping peace in Europe for almost 50 years and emerging victorious in the cold war. In my view, NATO remains a vital, effective military alliance which will continue—in its present form—to be the bedrock of U.S. security policy in Europe.

In his biography, Harry Truman cited NATO, together with the Marshall plan, as the greatest achievements of his Presidency. The Senate should not do anything to undermine his legacy or the effectiveness of this great alliance.

The condition I am introducing today is straightforward. It requires the President to certify "that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further expansion in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a period of at least three years" beginning on the date of entry into force of the last of the Protocols of Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Why is this condition necessary? Assuming the Protocols of Accession are approved by all 16 nations, this condition would give NATO an opportunity to begin to integrate the first three new members and assess the impact of this first round of expansion before proceeding to any future rounds.

There are many unanswered questions concerning this first round of expansion.

What will the true costs of expansion be for current and new members? Estimates have ranged from a low of \$1.5 billion over 10 years to a high of \$125 billion over the same timeframe. What is the U.S. share of this cost and will our current allies fairly share the burdens of expansion?

How long will it take for these new nations to modernize their militaries

to the point where they can make a positive contribution to the security of the alliance? NATO's 10-year cost time line indicates that NATO is planning on at least a decade of modernization and integration efforts. Do we really want to add additional burdens to that ambitious plan?

On a related issue, Thursday's "Washington Post" carried an article entitled, "Poland Unable to Perform All NATO Tasks." Citing "budgetary shortfalls," the Polish Defense Ministry announced that Poland would only be able to meet 70% of its expected military roles within NATO upon accession. What is interesting about this story is not the military shortfalls—which many of us anticipated—but the fact that these shortfalls are being revealed as NATO is currently going through the process of assessing the military capabilities of these three nations and establishing force goals for them. This is a process which will not be completed until late spring or early summer—months after the Senate is being asked to act on these Protocols.

I am led to the inevitable conclusion that we are being asked to act on the vital issue of NATO expansion in an information vacuum. In an October 1997 statement to the Senate Budget Committee, Susan Eisenhower addressed this issue with a frightening analogy: "If ratification is to be voted on now or in the next session, it would be as if an air traffic control agent had cleared a plane for take-off, knowing full well that the crew on board had filed several contradictory flight plans, didn't know when or if they'd pick up other passengers, and weren't even sure that their landing gear worked."

Returning to my series of questions: How will the Russians react to the reality of NATO expansion eastward? While I agree that the Russians should not be placed in a position of dictating United States or NATO policy, we must factor into this equation the reaction of the only nation on earth that possesses the military capability to destroy our nation.

Will the American people support the use of U.S. troops to defend Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and possibly more nations in Central and Eastern Europe? Or are our security commitments being stretched too thin?

Time alone will answer these questions. We should not rush forward with a follow-on expansion round beginning in April 1999, immediately after these first three new members take their seat at the table. We need to know the impact of this first round on the alliance and not allow ourselves to be swayed by political reasons to rush ahead, uninformed.

I well remember the NATO debates of the 1980's when Senator Mansfield, former majority leader, led the charge to withdraw our troops from Europe. Other picked up his mantle when he departed the Senate. Almost annually, those of us who supported NATO were

summoned to come to the floor and defend the U.S. troop commitment to NATO. I fear that we could see a repeat of those times if we do not proceed cautiously with NATO expansion, and ensure that any expansion has the full support of the American people who will ultimately bear the burden for these added security commitments.

In a June 1997 report entitled, "NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century," Professor Michael Mandelbaum expressed these concerns in the following way:

When the American public decides that an international commitment has been extended under false pretenses, or that such a commitment is more expensive than its government has promised, or that whatever the government has promised the cost of the commitment is too high, it tends to withdraw its support, which causes the commitment in question to collapse.

That is my biggest fear with NATO expansion—that it could undermine the American public's support for NATO itself.

I believe the 3-year timeframe contained in this condition is a reasonable one. It is long enough for NATO to have made a reasonable assessment of the impact of the first round, but it is not so long as to remove hope from future aspirants to NATO membership. Many have advocated a longer moratorium. My good friend and former colleague Sam Nunn, when he was still in the Senate, recommended a 10-year pause between rounds.

Senator Nunn recently joined with Senator Baker, General Scowcroft, and Alton Frye in an excellent op-ed regarding NATO expansion entitled, "NATO: A Debate Recast." They join me in a call for caution on any further rounds of expansion. According to this article, "NATO should be the cornerstone of an evolving security order in Europe . . . But a cornerstone is not a sponge. The function of a cornerstone is to protect its own integrity to support a wider security structure, not to dissipate its cohesion by absorbing members and responsibilities beyond prudent limits." They recommend a "definite, if not permanent, pause" in the process of expansion.

Former Secretaries Perry and Christopher also recently joined the ranks of those urging caution regarding further expansion of the alliance. I do not want to misrepresent their position—they clearly state that the door should remain open to membership for all Partnership for Peace nations. However, they argue that "no additional nations should be designated for admission until the three countries now in the NATO queue (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) are fully prepared to bear the responsibilities of membership and have been fully integrated into the alliance military and political structures." While they do not endorse the idea of a mandated pause, they clearly believe that the process should be slowed down. I agree.

I urge my colleagues to join me in this endeavor to inject an element of

caution into U.S. policy on this important issue.

I also want to add that in the course of my trip to Europe two weeks ago with the Secretary of Defense, we visited Russia. We visited with the Defense Minister, Marshall Sergeyev, and the Foreign Minister, and we had a very valuable session with about eight members of the Russian Duma. NATO expansion was their No. 1 area of concern regarding the relationship between the United States and Russia today. That relationship, in the minds of many, is deteriorating—deteriorating at the very time when we are making a number of collaborative efforts to try to lessen not only tensions that still remain between our two nations but in furtherance of the recognition that the world can become a more peaceful and a more secure place if Russia and the United States join in many areas to provide that peaceful security.

For example, Bosnia. Today there is a contingent of professional Russian military serving alongside U.S. forces and those of our allied nations. That is a most historic first.

While in Russia with the Secretary of Defense, we went to visit facilities which are utilizing moneys authorized and appropriated by the U.S. Senate, and Congress as a whole, again directed towards lessening the tensions between these two nations in the area of nuclear weapons.

We saw, for example, where American taxpayer dollars paid for equipment which the Russians are now using to dismantle, in accordance with framework of treaties, nuclear weapons in a safe manner using technology which originated here in the United States and supplemented by technology in Russia. There is only really one major threat to the security of this country that always hangs above all others; that is, that Russia still possesses, and for the foreseeable future will possess, a nuclear arsenal that could devastate our Nation. I am not suggesting in any way that we are not making progress toward the lessening of tensions, but it remains there. Of course, beneath that is the threat of spreading knowledge relating to weapons of mass destruction. Much of that knowledge is leaking out of the former Soviet Union, today Russia, as to how to manufacture those weapons.

I think that we should address in the context of the expansion argument the concerns of the Russian Duma, or the Russian leadership, regarding this expansion and how it might affect our relationship with Russia at this critical point in time.

This valuable NATO alliance has been with us for over a half a century. I don't suggest that we spend the next half century considering this expansion issue, but certainly the several months that we need can be allocated to the important debate that will take place in this Chamber, maybe a time less than several months, but certainly not

this rush of schedule that we are on now.

So I raise these issues today because the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I understand, intends to have a markup next week. I think, in fairness to him and to the colleagues on that committee and to other Senators, I and others should express these concerns in a timely fashion today.

Mr. President, that concludes my remarks.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes, prior to adjournment. Understanding, therefore, that I am all that stands between the Chamber and adjournment, I will try to speak less than 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### NYKESHA SALES

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, one of the great opportunities that comes with having been elected a Member of the U.S. Senate is to participate in deliberations on this great floor. Not just, may I say, the discussions and debates and votes on specific legislation, but to participate in what we call here morning business, which I have always seen as the people's forum, an opportunity to speak on events of the day, both public and, in some senses, those that are more personal. I would like to do that this morning.

The subject involves athletics, but it also involves, I think, values. This will not be the first time that any Member of the Senate has spoken on the floor about athletics, particularly about a team in his or her own home State. But the circumstances that lead me to stand today are somewhat different. In my own home State of Connecticut, and it seems in many places across the Nation, there are discussions in newspapers, in diners, on the radio, probably around the water cooler at the office, about what happened on the UCONN women's basketball team this week. Our great coach, Geno Auriemma, coach of our No. 2 ranked University of Connecticut women's basketball team—and, I may say with some honesty and a certain amount of envy, the occupant of the chair happens to come from the State where the No. 1 team is, Tennessee. But Coach Auriemma gave a most unusual gift, as it was put, to his All-America forward, Nykesha Sales, who is also a native of the State of Connecticut.

As is known by most, with the help of the Villanova Wildcats, who UCONN